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1 Abstract 
 
 
The case of Disney’s theme parks represents an opportunity to test major internationalisation 
theories in a setting of large investments with little chance for reversal of commitments. The 
purpose of the research is to study the benefit of different entry modes dependent on Disney’s 
Theme Parks value-generating resources and capabilities while conditioned to certain local 
industrial and institutional conditions in foreign markets.  
Five major theories and frameworks were used to analyze all four Disney’s ventures abroad. 
This resulted in 20 individual hypotheses analyzed. Results indicate that Disney followed a 
predictable internationalisation process in the cases of Tokyo, Hong Kong and Shanghai, but 
that it went off-path in the Paris one. In successful cases Disney followed a cautious 
approach, involving local partners to transfer and adapt the “Disney Experience”. In the case 
of Paris the company decided to enter the market alone, which neglected the unique needs of 
the local market.  
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2 Foreword 
This master thesis was written during the time period of spring 2010 and fall 2011 under the 
supervision of Professor Svein Ulset from the Norwegian School of Economics and Business 
Administration.  
The intent of research project was threefold. First, to study the different types of entry modes 
available for companies that decide to internationalize. Second, to investigate current major 
theories about the process of internationalisation. Third, to apply these theories and 
frameworks to the individual cases of Disney’s theme parks abroad. The overall balance of 
the thesis project remained approximately two thirds theoretical and one third practical.  
Perhaps the biggest challenge was to identify major internationalisation theories in a field 
characterized by extensive academic output. In this regard, previous work by Canabal and 
White (2008) that researched and identified major trends in internationalisation research 
proved invaluable in deciding which theories and frameworks to use. I strongly believe that 
the theories included in this research project cover all major aspects that companies have to 
face when going abroad. 
I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor Svein Ulset, for being of great help during the 
development of this thesis. I also thank Professor George Yip for the inspiration and advice 
during my academic period at the Rotterdam School of Management in the fall of 2010. 
 
Carlos Gonzalez Hernandez  
 
 
International Modes of Entry: The Case of Disney 
 
Page | 6  
 
3 Introduction 
“As global as possible, as local as necessary.” 
George Yip 
The purpose of the research is to study the benefit of different entry modes dependent on 
Disney’s Theme Parks unique resources and capabilities while conditioned to certain 
industrial and institutional conditions in foreign markets.  
More than 50 years ago Walt Disney revolutionized the concept of theme parks by creating 
Disneyland Anaheim in the American state of California. Today, the company thinks of 
theme parks as enchanting places that provide both children and adults with long-lasting 
“experiences of the heart”, something very few businesses can actually boast of delivering. 
Based on this unique competitive advantage, which Disney prefers to call the “Disney 
Difference”, the company decided to embark on the challenging project of exporting its 
theme parks abroad: first to Japan (‘83), then to France (‘92), and then back to Asia with the 
projects of Hong Kong (’06) and Shanghai (’15). 
Disney’s theme parks international entry strategies are as remarkable and far-reaching as the 
iconic characters on which the company’s image is based on. Little do visitors to Tokyo 
Disneyland know that the park is actually own and operated by a Japanese local firm under a 
licensing contract, or that it actually took Disney more than 20 years to convince itself to 
allow the Asian park to open, which is nowadays, ironically, one of the most visited 
amusement parks in the world (Clavé 2007).  
A company planning to expand its operations abroad has to choose between equity-based and 
non-equity-based entry modes in order to smooth the transfer of its resources and capabilities 
given certain local industrial and institutional conditions. On the one hand, selecting equity-
based entry modes implies deciding whether to service the foreign market on a stand-alone 
basis (e.g. wholly owned subsidiary) or with the assistance of a partner (e.g. joint venture). 
On the other, choosing non-equity-based entry modes involves deciding between exports or 
contractual agreements (Pan and Tse, 2000). Different local conditions at different foreign 
locations require specific entry mode strategies that best transfer resources and capabilities 
(Resource Based View) or that reduce transaction costs (Transaction Cost Economics). 
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The first part of this thesis is offers a theoretical review that comprises three main elements. 
First, an overview of the different types of entry modes is offered (e.g. licensing, joint 
ventures, wholly owned subsidiary). Second, five major internationalisation theories are 
introduced in the context of international modes of entry: Uppsala Model of 
Internationalisation, Transaction Cost Economics, Resource-Based View, Institutional 
Theory and Cultural Distance Theory. Finally, the concept of international diversification and 
firm performance is advanced in order to prepare the ground for a company-wide analysis of 
its international ventures.  
The second part of the research project includes the research method. In this section the 
whole construction of thesis is explained, including a visual research model. A case is made 
for a descripto-explanatory study with a deductive approach given the need to portray four 
different, but highly intertwined cases (Tokyo, Paris, Hong Kong and China).  
The third part of the study included four case studies: Disneyland Tokyo, Disneyland Paris 
(previously EuroDisney), Hong Kong Disneyland and Shanghai Disneyland. For each case a 
general description is offered with as much information as possible, followed by an analysis 
of the 5 hypothesis developed after all major internationalisation theories.  
Finally, a discussion of the results is offered followed by a conclusion where the results of the 
research projects are summarized. General recommendations are made for future projects that 
Disneyland might undertake.  
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4 Research Question, Objectives and Model 
Disney’s theme parks represent an interesting case study in the sense that the company has 
been able to exploit abroad a unique, hard-to-imitate asset, but that requires substantial 
adaptations. Moreover, it has done so in very diverse countries like France, Japan and Hong 
Kong with wildly different levels of success. Decisions on entry modes have clearly affected 
and continue to influence the economic performance of Disney’s international activities.  
4.1 Research Question 
Q. How different international entry modes affect Disney’s foreign theme parks performance 
given its unique resources and capabilities under different foreign conditions? 
4.2 Objectives 
1. To learn about international modes of entry, including the most recent perspectives. 
2. To examine the internationalisation process of a company and how decisions on entry 
modes fit in this process and affect the transfer of resources and capabilities. 
3. To analyze how local industrial and institutional conditions influence decisions on 
modes of entry. 
4. To find out how global entry strategies are made in reality for large projects like those 
of Disney’s theme parks (average investment is 5 billion US dollars).  
5. Personal objective: To learn how to conduct business research in an academic, master 
level setting. 
4.3 Research Model 
Figure 4-1. Research Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Influence of Local Industrial 
and Institutional Conditions 
                                       
Performance: Benefit 
of Particular Modes of 
Entry  
Mode 
of 
Disney Theme Parks 
Unique Resources and 
Capabilities  
 
Internationalisation Process 
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5 Theory / Literature Review 
Extant literature on international modes of entry is rich and represents the third most 
researched field in international management (Canabal and White, 2008). First, a general 
overview of the different types of entry modes will be introduced. Second, the most relevant 
frameworks used to analyze the relative merits of different entry modes given a certain set of 
firm-specific and non-firm-specific factors will be provided. Finally, a framework to analyze 
firm international diversification and performance is provided.  
Figure 5-1. An integrated 
TCE strategy model for Entry 
into Foreign Markets 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Ulset, Svein. (September, 
2009). Entry Strategies in a Global 
Context. Lecture conducted from 
Norwegian School of Economics 
and Business Administration 
 
 
 
The choice of specific theories and frameworks is based on the TCE strategy model for entry 
into foreign markets (Ulset, 2009) and complemented with Canabal and White’s extensive 
theoretical review on the subject (2008) which shows that Uppsala model, TCE, Resource-
Based View, Institution Theory and Cultural Distance Theory are some of the most frequent 
tools to analyze entry mode strategies and the ones that best fit Disney’s internationalisation 
process. Dunning’s OLI (Ownership, Location and Internalisation) Paradigm is also 
extensively researched by academics, but will only be included as an Appendix (See 
Appendix I) due to its overlapping with the rest of the theories.  
The goal of this section is to provide as many theories as necessary in order to better explain 
Disney’s challenges when going abroad. Specifically, how to choose the entry mode that best 
transfers and adapts a highly unique asset while still maintaining the “Disney Flavour” and 
adapting to local tastes. In other words, to explain how Disney may achieve the contradictory 
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goal of being American and local at the same time, which we will refer in this study as the 
Disney internationalisation paradox.  
5.1 Type of entry modes 
Entry modes can be divided into equity-based and non-equity-based. Within equity-base 
modes, the choices are between Wholly Owned Subsidiaries (WOS) and Joint Ventures (JV) 
with different degrees of ownership. Among non-equity-base modes, the choice is between 
contractual agreements and exports. Different entry modes are associated with different levels 
of committed resources, amount of control, technology risk and profit potential, with equity-
based entry modes normally offering the highest levels of exposure, and hence higher levels 
of risk, control and return (Osland, Taylor and Zou, 2001).  
Figure 5-2. Resources 
Committed Vs. Level of 
Control 
 
 
 
Source: Osland, Gregory, Charles 
Taylor and Shaoming Zou. 
"Selecting International Modes of 
Entry and Expansion." Marketing 
Intelligence & Planning Vol. 19 
No. 3 (2001):  155 
 
 
 
Resource commitments are dedicated assets that cannot be employed for other uses without 
incurring in additional costs. They can be intangible, such as managerial skills, or tangible, 
such as plant and machinery. The quantity of required resources varies with the entry mode, 
from almost nothing with indirect exporting, to minimal in licensing and extensive in 
Greenfield investments in WOS. Level of control is the capability and motivation of a firm to 
influence decisions, systems, and methods in foreign countries. Technology risk is the 
possibility that a firm’s applied knowledge will be accidentally leaked to a local firm 
(Osland, Taylor and Zou, 2001). Resource commitment, level of control and technology risk 
are highly intertwined in the sense that, for example, higher levels of control involve a higher 
commitment of resources, but less technology risk, and vice versa. 
Export
Licensing
Joint Venture
WOS
Resources Committed
Control
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As described in the next section, different entry modes have different performance outcomes 
based on their resource commitment, level of control and technology risk demands. The 
selection of an entry mode is an issue of high strategic magnitude as each entry mode delivers 
specific benefits and risks. Acquisitions are the fastest way to build a market presence in a 
foreign market, yet they involve risks of overpayment, inability to assess the real value of 
acquired assets, and post-acquisition problems like cross-cultural assimilation. Greenfield 
investments offer the greatest control over subsidiaries, yet they often require the longest time 
to establish and need the greatest transfer of resources and capabilities. Joint ventures are a 
way to leverage the resources of a local partner in order to maximize local knowledge and 
minimize risk, but also involve issues of managing a business relationship with a partner 
whose interests may be different from those of the company, as well as high possibilities of 
suffering from technology risk (Chang and Rosenzweig, 2001). 
Figure 5-3. Hierarchical 
Model of Choice of Entry 
Modes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Pan, Yigang and David K. 
Tse. “The Hierarchical Model of 
Market Entry Modes”. Journal of 
International Business Studies, 
Vol. 31, No. 4 (4th Qtr., 2000): 538 
 
 
 
5.1.1 Exports 
Exports differ from other entry modes in that the final or intermediate product is 
manufactured outside the target country and the subsequently transferred to it. On the one 
hand, indirect exporting uses agents located in the company’s home country to handle the 
entire sale, including shipping and marketing, to the foreign market. Direct exporting, on the 
other hand, means that the company itself is in charge of selling and delivering the products 
to the target market (Osland, Taylor and Zou, 2001). Indirect exporting offers the less 
learning benefits to the firm, while direct exporting involves more interaction with the foreign 
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market and is usually the first step of the internationalisation process of every firm (Johanson 
and Vahlne, 1977).  
Research by Osland, Taylor and Zou (2001) showed that American companies typically use 
export as a mode of entry decision when the foreign market in question is viewed as highly 
competitive and where the investment in a WOS is deemed as unnecessary.  
5.1.2 Contractual Agreements 
Contractual agreements can be divided into licensing, R&D contracts, and alliances. 
Licensing, for example, is a contractual agreement with one or more agents in the foreign 
country in which the company transfer the right to use all or part of the following property: 
patents, trademarks, company name, technology, and/or business methods. The licensee pays 
initial fees and/or a percentage of sales to the licensor (Osland, Taylor and Zou, 2001). 
Licensing is a preferred mode of entry when the local government of the foreign country is 
strong and prefers to conduct business with national companies. Unfortunately licensing 
increases technology risk by exposing the company’s products and services to potential future 
competitors.     
5.1.3 Joint Ventures 
Joint Ventures involve direct investment in the foreign country and can be minority JV’s 
(ownership is less than 50%), 50% JV’s, and majority JV’s (ownership is more than 50%). 
JV’s usually involve two or more companies that share the ownership, management, risks, 
and profits of the newly created entity. Each firm contributes equity that may take the form of 
money, assets, and/or technology (Osland, Taylor and Zou, 2001).    
JV’s are usually used when the foreign country has established rules against the operation of 
a local company by foreigners. This vehicle is also used when the psychic distance between 
the home and host country is elevated and local knowledge is paramount to the business 
success. JV’s also suffer from high technology risk.    
5.1.4 Wholly Owned Subsidiaries 
Wholly Owned Subsidiaries can take the form of Greenfield investments and Mergers & 
Acquisitions. They function as subsidiaries in another country in which the parent company 
retains full ownership and sole responsibility for the administration of the operation (Osland, 
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Taylor and Zou, 2001). WOS offer companies the highest level of control and the lowest 
levels of technology risk, but they also require the highest level of resource commitments. 
In conclusion, the choice of entry mode is at the same time also a preference between risk and 
return. Certainly, each entry mode differs in terms of costs and benefits, with some being 
practically cost-less, such as indirect exporting, and other extremely expensive, such as WOS. 
Moreover, each firm has to consider the equation of costs and benefits on a project by project 
basis, as it is repeatedly a function of firm-specific resources and different local conditions. In 
other words, what was useful in once place might be a mistake in another one. Academics 
have made an effort to develop useful frameworks in order to approach the entry mode 
problem, which is topic of the next sections.   
5.2 Selecting international modes of entry: Five theories 
Ultimately firms have to decide on a mode of entry to use. Three main schools of thought 
have tried to explain the reasons behind these choices. The first school views 
internationalisation as a gradual process where the firm will increase its market commitment 
(from a non-equity entry mode to an equity-based one) once knowledge about a particular 
foreign market increases and justifies it. This is the so-called “staged process of 
internationalisation”, or Uppsala Model (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977). The second school of 
thought stems from work on Transaction Cost Economics (TCE). The idea behind TCE is 
that firms will internationalise those activities in which they have a cost advantage over the 
market and will subcontract those in which they have a cost disadvantage (Williamson 1981; 
Teece 1986). Finally, the third school of thought is the one pioneered by Dunning (1995), 
which stresses the importance of location advantages in addition to ownership and 
internalisation factors as decisive elements in mode of entry decisions and is something of a 
“one-size-fits-all” approach. This last school of thought is only included in Appendix I due to 
its overlapping with the rest of internationalisation theories. In addition to these schools of 
thought, the Resource-Based View, Institutional Theory and Cultural Distance Theory are 
also provided given their unique perspective on the topic of internationalisation that at times 
are in direct contrast with other major theories, yet offering the only plausible solutions to the 
Disney paradox (the need to be American and local at the same time).  
Recently, TCE and the Resource-Based View have become the major theories to explain 
entry mode choices (Sharma & Erramilli, 2004). While both theories use diverse approaches, 
their underlying logic is not necessarily mutually exclusive. Rather, by ignoring the influence 
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and complementarities of the other theories, single-minded approaches run the risk of missing 
important angles that affect the best choice of entry mode. Perhaps this is the reason of the 
success within practitioners of Dunning’s Eclectic Paradigm, which conciliates all theories 
into a single, one-size-fits-all framework (See Appendix I).  
5.2.1 Uppsala Model: A trade-off between market knowledge and market commitment 
The model is based on empirical observations at the University of Uppsala (hence the 
Uppsala Model) that shows that Swedish firms often develop their international operations in 
small steps, rather than by making large foreign investments at single points in time. 
Typically, firms start exporting to a country via an agent, later establish a sales subsidiary, 
and eventually begin production in the host country. Moreover, such establishments are 
related to the psychic distance between the home and the host countries. Psychic distance is 
the sum of factors preventing the flow of information from and to the market, like language, 
education, business practices, culture, and industrial development (Johanson and Vahlne, 
1977). 
Market knowledge (general and market specific) and market commitment (amount of 
resources committed and the degree of commitment) are assumed to affect both commitment 
decisions (scale and types of operations) and the way current activities (primary source of 
experience) are performed. These same current activities, in return, affect knowledge and 
commitment (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977). 
There is a direct relation between market knowledge and market commitment. Knowledge 
can be considered a resource, and consequently the better the knowledge about a market, the 
more valuable are the resources and the stronger is the commitment to the market. Under this 
model, a firm will incrementally extend its scale of existing operations in the market until its 
tolerable risk frontier is met. Market experience can offset uncertain market conditions, but 
only to a certain point. The less uncertainty (either because of high market experience or 
stable local conditions) the more the firm will favour scale-increasing decisions (Johanson 
and Vahlne, 1977). 
Additional commitments will be made in small steps unless the firm has very large resources 
and/or market conditions are stable and homogeneous, or the firm has previous relevant 
experience from other markets with similar market conditions. If not, market experience will 
lead to a step-wise increase in the scale of operations and of the integration with the market 
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environment where steps will be taken to correct imbalance with respect to the risk situation 
in the market. Market growth will speed up this process (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977). 
Hypothesis 1: Disney’s entry mode processes are consistent with the Uppsala Model 
given the high psychic distance between the company and its host markets. 
5.2.2 Transaction Cost Economics: Exploiting a unique asset abroad at a minimum cost 
The transaction cost approach to the study of economic organization regards the ‘transaction’ 
as the basic unit of analysis and states that transaction cost economizing is crucial to the 
decision made by the organization, which is viewed in this theory as a governance structure 
(Williamson, 1981, 1985). According to the theory, the costs of an economic transaction, 
including ex-ante (negotiating contracts) and ex-post costs (monitoring), may or may not 
exceed the costs of organizing the transaction internally. Moreover, different governance 
structures such as Licensing Agreements and Wholly Owned Subsidiaries will have different 
levels of transactions costs and asset specificity (site specificity, physical asset specificity and 
human asset specificity) that will affect its selection (to avoid bilateral monopolies, for 
example). Firms should select the governance mode as a response to the expected transaction 
costs. In particular, the firm should strive for the most efficient entry mode, which is the one 
that minimizes total transaction costs.  
Behavioural assumptions are relevant within the TCA theory. ‘Bounded rationality’ 
acknowledges that it is impossible to deal with complexity. As a consequence, incomplete 
contracting is the best that can be achieved. Complexity in contracting will be further affected 
by ‘opportunism’, since the mere existence of economic agents that engage in dishonest 
behaviour will make it costly for the firm to discern between opportunistic and 
nonopportunistic trade partners ex-ante (Williamson, 1981, 1985). The parties, therefore, 
have an incentive to develop specialized governance structures to prevent opportunism 
(Teece, 1986). 
David Teece (1986) summarized the conditions that must be present for a firm to become a 
multinational according to TCA theory: 
1. Own special assets which give it a competitive advantage over indigenous firms 
(strategic advantage factor). 
2. These assets are more economically utilized in facilities outside the firm’s local 
market (location factor).  
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3. The best way to profit in full from the asset abroad is to transfer the asset internally 
within the firm (transactions costs factor).  
All three factors must be present to explain FDI. Multinational enterprises are a reaction to 
high transaction costs by firms with unique assets/capabilities which have value when utilized 
in production facilities abroad (Teece, 1986). Conversely, the lack of some these factors will 
explain hybrid structures such as joint venture.  
Governance costs can be drawn of as a function of asset specificity (see picture below). If 
asset specificity (contractual hazard) is low, a market solution such as licensing is generally 
sufficient. If asset specificity is higher, then governance costs in the form of bounded rational 
behaviour, opportunistic behaviour and uncertainty of transactions are also higher. Under 
such conditions a market solution is no longer feasible and other governance modes with 
higher levels of control, such as JV’s and WOS should be investigated (Williamson, 1981, 
1985: Teece 1986). 
Figure 5-4. Governance costs 
as a function of Asset 
Specificity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Adapted from: Williamson (1981, 
1985), Teece (1986) 
 
 
 
If total transaction costs are expected to be small, a rational firm will most likely prefer to let 
the market perform its transactions. Such would be the case of perfectly competitive markets. 
Yet, since markets are hardly ever perfectly competitive, various conditions might favour 
internalisation over market transactions (Williamson, 1981, 1985). Under these circumstances 
the costs of monitoring and protecting against opportunism and contractual hazard are likely 
to be larger than the costs of an internal governance structure such as a WOS (Luo, 2001).  
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Figure 5-5. Governance 
costs as a function of Asset 
Specificity with boundaries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Adapted from: Williamson (1981, 
1985), Teece (1986) 
 
 
 
Teece (1986) also introduced the role of government in transaction costs. A firm that has 
engaged in horizontal or vertical integration in order to save on transaction costs also creates 
a direct interface between the newly created multinational enterprise and the host 
government: “To the extent that host governments treat multinational enterprises differently 
from indigenous enterprises, the foreign firm may have circumvented one set of potential 
recontracting hazard through direct investment only to encounter another.” Thus, a firm has 
to weight the total advantages and disadvantages of going abroad before committing to a 
certain governance structure that might end up causing major complications.  
TCE Criticism 
Regarding entry modes, TCE offers a polychotomous choice (different degrees of 
ownership). Nonetheless, empirical evidence suggests that the theory is more effective when 
discriminating between the dichotomous options of equity versus non-equity (Sharma & 
Erramilli, 2004). Another criticism of TCE is that it tends to treat each particular entry 
decision in isolation, rather than as part of the overall firm’s strategy (Hill, Hwang and Kim, 
1990), which is why this view will be complemented, among others, by the Resource-Based 
View.  
Hypothesis 2: Disney’s possession of a unique asset that grants it with a competitive 
advantage over indigenous firms will induce the company to profit from it internally 
when market transaction costs are high and externally when low. 
International Modes of Entry: The Case of Disney 
 
Page | 18  
 
5.2.3 Resource-Based View: Strategical transfer of resources with minimal erosion in value 
In contrast to the TCE rationale, which focuses mainly on cost and risk minimization, the 
Resource-Based View (RBV) examines the link between the firm resources and sustained 
competitive advantage. RBV differentiates from other frameworks by not basing its 
argumentation on current market conditions (imperfection or failure). In its place it offers an 
opportunity to elucidate entry mode choices from the reference of a company’s resources and 
capabilities alone (Sharma and Erramilli, 2004). Unlike TCE, RBV successfully explains why 
not all firms select the same cost-cutting strategy that is supposed to minimize transaction 
costs. Companies tend to choose an internationalisation strategy that is dependent on its firm-
specific value-generating resources.  
According to the RBV, in order to generate competitive advantage, a firm’s resources have to 
be valuable, rare, imperfectly inimitable and non-substitutable (Barney, 1997). The Resource-
Based view is an inside-out view of the firm rather than an outside-in view. In contrast to the 
market-based view of the firm, the resource-based view considers a firm as unique because of 
its possession and deployment of firm-specific resources that are valuable, rare, imperfectly 
inimitable and non-substitutable. Moreover, firm-specific resources cover a wider range of 
competitive advantages than the ownership advantages of, for example, the OLI paradigm 
(see Appendix I). Furthermore, these competitive advantages are not constrained to the 
present since they may also help in the creation and transfer of future competitive advantages 
via selected modes of entry (Sharma and Erramilli, 2004). For instance, transferability of 
resources and capabilities is easier with equity-based mode of entry than with non-equity-
based ones.  
The resource-based view of the firm explains the selection of entry mode via four major 
constructs according to likelihood of establishing or transferring competitive advantages to 
the host country (Sharma and Erramilli, 2004):  
• Probability of establishing competitive advantage in production operations in a host 
country. 
• Probability of establishing competitive advantage in marketing operations in a host 
country. 
• Capability to transfer advantage generating resources in production operations to host 
country partners.  
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• Capability to transfer advantage generating resources in marketing operations to host 
country partners.  
The first two constructs are associated to the location decision of production and/or 
marketing operations in the host country, whereas the last two involve the ownership 
decision. In the resource-based framework the benefit required is the effective and/or 
efficient transfer of resources and capabilities to the foreign market with minimal erosion in 
their value (Sharma and Erramilli, 2004). Most entry modes are effective in preserving the 
value of transferred resources and capabilities; it is the level of efficiency that varies the 
most.   
The resource-based view therefore predicts that a company will locate its foreign activities in 
countries where the likelihood of effectively and efficiently transferring its resources and 
capabilities is higher. In contrast, it explains two factors that may constrain 
internationalisation: resources and capabilities might be home-specific or not compatible with 
other host country factors. In addition, certain governments might limit the amount of 
resources (e.g. human resources) that a company can transfer to the host country.  
In summary, a company’s capability to establish competitive advantage in a host country 
depends on the degree to which it can efficiently and/or effectively transfer its competitive 
advantage generating resources to the host country and the compatibility of transferred firm-
specific resources with foreign country factors (Sharma and Erramilli, 2004). If the ability to 
transfer firm-specific resources to foreign partners is low, equity-based modes of entry will 
be favoured, whereas high transferability will promote the use of market and partnership 
transactions.    
Contribution of the Resource-Based View beyond Transaction Cost Economics 
The evaluation of the entry mode decision differs widely between the RBV and other 
frameworks. RBV strives for value maximization while the TCE approach for minimization 
transaction costs and risks. Both RBV and TCE offer sometimes similar conclusions. Both 
agree with the basic premise that companies will try to profit from an asset internally when 
the costs of transferring the assets via a hybrid structure outweighs its benefits, and externally 
when the benefits are higher than the costs. Nonetheless, RBV emphasizes the strategic 
implications for a firm’s resource deployment. For instance, it is capable of not only 
explaining the entry mode choices based on the exploitations of those existing advantages 
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(TCE), but can also explain those decisions that are based upon the development of new 
advantages (Sharma and Erramilli, 2004). In other words, a decision that might not make 
sense from a TCE perspective might be perfectly normal according to RBV. The RBV offers 
a fresh perspective that augments that of TCE by considering a firm’s strategic resource 
endowment and deployment. Central to RBV is the effective and/or efficient transfer of 
resources to the host market with minimal erosion in their value. RBV can be thought of as an 
approach where cost itself (TCE) is not the only determinant in a mode of entry decision. 
Table 5-1 Comparison between RBV and TCE 
Comparison TCE RBV 
Unit of Analysis Transaction Firm 
Motivation for entry 
Market failure Generation and sustainability of 
competitive advantage 
Focus Transaction characteristics Resources and Capabilities 
Derived benefit 
Minimize transaction costs  
(complexity and monitoring) 
Maximize resources and 
capabilities 
Justification Exploitation of firm’s unique assets abroad Exploitation and development  
Essential elements 
Opportunism,  bounded rationality, 
contractual hazard, risk preference for 
entry modes 
Valuable and inimitable resources, 
partner’s absorptive capacity 
Sources: Williamson (1981, 1985), Sharma and Erramilli (2004), Hill, Hwang and Kim (1990), Teece 
(1986), Luo (2001). 
To summarize, the firm’s governance decision is a function of the firm’s ability to effectively 
transfer its resources to the foreign country without erosion of value and the country’s ability 
to effectively absorb them. Only when both elements are present may the company choose to 
use market or collaborative mechanisms, else it has to rely on higher levels of control to 
avoid eroding its competitive advantage. The ownership decision according to the RBV is 
primarily determined by the firm’s ability to transfer its key value-generating resources to a 
local partner firm. If the firm is able to effectively and/or efficiently make such a transfer, it 
may select collaborative modes, otherwise WOS only (Sharma and Erramilli, 2004), above 
and beyond transaction cost considerations. 
Hypothesis 4: Disney will attempt to use equity-based entry modes when the 
absorptive capacity of a local partner is low and non-equity ones when high. 
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5.2.4 Institutional Theory: The tension between internal and external isomorphism 
Institutional theory analyses how companies enter and operate in an institutional environment 
defined by certain rules, norms, and values (Davis, Desai, and Francis, 2000). An important 
feature of institutional theory is isomorphism, that is, pressures to imitate local firms that may 
have a considerable influence on entry mode selection. Companies venturing into foreign 
countries will try to mimic local firm actions in order to legitimize their operations and 
market presence (Canabal and White III, 2008). The focus is on the roles of external 
institutions in shaping companies’ decisions and behaviours, including decision on 
international modes of entry.  
Companies suffer in fact from two very distinct and conflictive forms isomorphism: external 
and internal. External isomorphic forces represent the foreign environment in which the firm 
operates and that it will try to mimic in order to gain legitimacy in the host country’s market. 
Internal isomorphic forces are the pressures to stay in line with headquarter practices (Davis, 
Desai, and Francis, 2000). The relative dominance of these two distinct isomorphic pressures 
will define the behaviour of firms since inception, that is, from the decision to 
internationalize onwards. Local pressure for isomorphism may stem from economic or 
regulatory reasons. For instance, some countries regulatory environment obliges companies 
to set structures and practices similar to those already in place.  
In general, the higher the resources committed and/or level of control from the parent 
company to foreign operations the higher the pressures for internal isomorphism. The lower 
these factors are, as in the case of exporting or licensing, the higher the pressures for external 
isomorphism will be. Moreover, when pressure for internal and external isomorphism is 
equally high companies will then to use a mix of international entry modes (Davis, Desai, and 
Francis, 2000). In fact certain viable modes of entry will sometimes be overlooked purely 
because of institutional pressures, which confirm the importance of this paradigm when 
analyzing entry mode decisions. 
In selecting between a WOS and a JV, a study by Yiu and Makino (2002) showed that 
institutional forces may influence the selection of entry modes in different magnitudes. Their 
analysis suggested that the more restrictive the regulatory environment of the host country is, 
the more likely a joint venture will be chosen over a wholly owned subsidiary. Moreover, the 
more restrictive the normative domain of the host country, the more likely the multinational 
enterprise will choose a JV over a WOS. Finally, they discovered that companies will tend to 
International Modes of Entry: The Case of Disney 
 
Page | 22  
 
select the mode of entry that has been used most frequently in the past by other companies in 
the same foreign country. 
Corruption is a pervasive force best analyzed within the institutional view framework that 
heavily affects international mode of entry decisions. Research by Uhlenbruck et al. (2006) 
suggested that firms favoured non-equity-based entry modes rather than equity-based ones 
when they enter countries with high levels of corruption. Companies in fact avoid dealing 
directly with corruption, without having to give up the market potential of an affected 
country, by choosing non-equity modes like JV or contractual agreements.   
In sum, according to institution theory the selection of international entry modes is 
constrained by two isomorphism forces: internal (parent company) and external (host 
country). Both parental and external institutions norms influence greatly the entry mode 
selection. Foreign operations that are highly influenced by the parent company (e.g. the case 
of companies following a global strategy) will tend to favour equity-based entry modes like 
WOS, while those more highly influenced by the local environment will prefer non-equity-
based entry modes, like exports or licensing. What make this theory relevant for the Disney 
case is that the company seems to be suffering from equally high forces for external and 
internal isomorphism. This is the so-called Disney paradox that we introduced earlier in the 
document, that is, the need to be American and local at the same time.  
Differences between the Institutional and Cultural Distance/Uppsala Model 
The main difference between the Institutional Theory and the Cultural Distance Theory and 
Uppsala Model lays in its unique focus on internal and external isomorphism. Only this 
approach is able to capture Disney’s dual need to mimic its foreign markets (external 
isomorphism) while maintaining the “Disney flavour” (internal isomorphism). On the one 
hand, Cultural Distance Theory is concerned with predicting/explaining a firm’s entry mode 
decision based purely on the home country’s cultural traits. For instance, a company from a 
country with high uncertainty avoidance will prefer JV’s and WOS over acquisitions, all the 
time and regardless of other factors (Makino and Neupert, 2000). On the other hand, the 
Uppsala Model represents a step-by-step stages model where the decision to go abroad is a 
function of the relationship between market knowledge and market commitment (Johanson 
and Vahlne, 1997). That is, a firm will “commit” to a certain mode of entry that is a result of 
its current knowledge about the local market, not because of the internal or external pressures 
for isomorphism. In this regard, the Institutional Theory does include characteristics of both 
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the Cultural Distance Theory and Uppsala Model, but offers a fresh perspective on 
internationalisation by isolating the effect of internal and external isomorphic pressures. For 
instance, a company might decide to always use WOS regardless of its local culture and 
regardless of the psychic distance between its markets. An example of this being IKEA, who 
owns all its stores abroad given its unusually high pressures for internal isomorphism. In this 
regard, both the Cultural Distance Theory and the Uppsala Model would have failed to 
explain IKEA’s phenomenon.  
Hypothesis 5: Disney will favour non-equity-based entry modes when pressures for 
external isomorphism are high and equity-based ones when pressures for internal 
isomorphism are high.   
5.2.5 Cultural Distance Theory: Entry modes are highly influenced by cultural traits 
Culture refers to the ‘‘collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members 
of one category of people from those of another’’ (Hofstede, 1984, p. 389). Research by 
Makino and Neupert (2000) suggested that a firm’s preferred level of ownership in their 
foreign subsidiaries is influenced primarily by cultural traits. Cultural distance refers to the 
distance between two cultures. In the case of entry modes, cultural distance is defined as the 
one existing between a firm’s home and host country. Hofstede found, after an extensive 
survey, four cultural value dimensions: Power Distance, Individualism-Collectivism, 
Masculinity-Femininity and Uncertainty Avoidance. 
The first one, power distance, defines the extent to which the less powerful person in a 
society accepts inequality in power and considers it normal. The second one, Individualism-
Collectivism, assumes that persons from individualistic societies look primarily after their 
own interest and that of their immediate family, while those from collectivistic cultures 
presume that individuals belong to one or more close groups, like extended families. The 
third one, Masculinity-Femininity, describes masculine societies as those expecting men to be 
assertive, competitive, to strive for material success, and to respect whatever is big, strong, 
and fast. Feminine cultures define relatively open roles for men and women and don’t expect 
either of them to be ambitious or competitive, while expecting them to value quality of life, 
interpersonal relationships and concern for the weak. Finally, the fourth dimension, 
Uncertainty Avoidance, defines the degree to which individuals within a culture are made 
nervous by situations that they consider to be unstructured, unclear, or unpredictable, and the 
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degree to which they try to avoid such situations by adopting strict codes of behaviour and a 
belief in absolute truths (Hofstede, 1984, p. 390). 
Literature on the topic has shown that uncertainty over the foreign market influences 
decisions on international modes of entry. A study by Kogut and Singh (1988) about the 
effect of national culture on the choice of entry mode suggested that when economic choice is 
compared across countries, cultural characteristics are likely to have profound implications. 
Their research discovered that the higher the cultural distance between the home and host 
country, the higher the probability that a firm will choose a JV or a Wholly Owned 
Greenfield over an acquisition –management of acquisitions from distant cultures is seen as 
expensive-. Furthermore, the greater the uncertainty avoidance in the home country relative 
to the host country, the more likely the firm will select a JV or a Wholly Owned Greenfield 
over an acquisition. Acquisitions are seen by countries with a high uncertainty avoidance 
index as involving greater uncertainty that other modes of entry with higher levels of control. 
Acquisitions are not available for Disney and therefore this last idea will not be tested.  
Difference between the Cultural Approach and the Uppsala Model of Internationalisation  
It might be thought that Cultural Distance Theory is a subset of the all-encompassing Uppsala 
Stage Model of Internationalisation, especially given that psychic distance includes culture 
within its definition. On the one hand, Johanson and Vahlne (1997), the pioneers of the 
Uppsala Model, defined psychic distance as the sum of factors preventing the flow of 
information from and to the market, such as language, education, business practices, culture, 
and industrial development. Flow of information can be affected by several factors, and lack 
of one element may be offset by expertise in another. The authors observed that “...additional 
commitments will be made in small steps unless the firm has very large resources” (Johanson 
and Vahlne, (1997), p.30), thus implying that a large amount of resources could offset, 
among other factors, large cultural distances. On the other hand, Cultural Distance Theory 
states that a firm’s preferred governance mode in their foreign subsidiaries is primarily 
influenced by cultural traits regardless of psychic distance, Makino and Neupert (2000). 
Cultural Distance Theory explains entry modes by looking “inside” into the home country’s 
culture of the firm, while the Uppsala Model looks “outside”.  
Hypothesis 6: Cultural distance theory is sufficient to explain Disney’s entry mode 
decisions and the higher its magnitude the likelier the firm will choose hybrid 
governance structures. 
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6 Hypothesis Summary 
In total 5 hypotheses (Uppsala Model, TCE, Institutional Theory, Resource-Based View and Cultural 
Distance Theory) will be confronted against the real cases of Tokyo, Paris, Hong Kong and China, for 
a total of 20 comparisons.  The following is a summary table of the hypotheses tested. 
Table 6-1 Hypotheses and theories summary 
Framework Tokyo Paris Hong Kong China 
Uppsala Stage 
Process 
Disney’s entry mode processes are consistent with the Uppsala Model given the 
high psychic distance between the company and its host markets. 
Theories tested: Johanson and Vahlne (1977) 
TCE 
Disney’s possession of a unique asset that grants it with a competitive 
advantage over indigenous firms will induce the company to profit from it 
internally when market transaction costs are high and externally when low. 
Theories tested: Williamson (1981, 1985) and Teece (1986) 
Resource-Based  
View 
Disney will attempt to use equity-based entry modes when the absorptive 
capacity of a local partner is low and non-equity ones when high. 
Theories tested: Barney (1997) and Sharma and Erramilli (2004) 
Institutional 
Theory 
Disney will favour non-equity-based entry modes when pressures for external 
isomorphism are high and equity-based ones when pressures for internal 
isomorphism are high.   
Theories tested: Canabal and White III (2008), Davis et al. (2000),  Yiu and 
Makino (2002) and  Uhlenbruck et al. (2006) 
Cultural Distance 
Theory 
Cultural distance alone is sufficient to explain Disney’s entry mode decisions 
and the higher its magnitude the likelier the firm will choose hybrid governance 
structures. 
Theories tested: Hofstede (1984), Makino and Neupert (2000) and Kogut and 
Singh (1988) 
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6.1 International Diversification and firm performance 
Once these hypotheses are tested, Disney as a whole will be examined to see how well it 
adapts to current theories of international diversification and firm performance, in particular 
the S-Curve hypothesis. Research by Lu and Beamish (2004) found that the returns from an 
international diversification strategy were associated to costs and benefits that varied 
depending on the extent of a firm’s level of internationalization. This relationship resulted in 
a horizontal S-curve, which at the beginning showed a decline in performance with increasing 
internationalization, followed by an increase in performance which then declined at very high 
levels of international diversification. 
Figure 6-1. 
International 
diversification and 
Performance: A 
Three-Phase Model 
 
 
 
Source: Lu, Jane and Paul 
Beamish. International 
Diversification and Firm 
Performance: The S-
Curve Hypothesis. 
Academy of Management 
Journal, Vol. 47 No. 4 
(2004): p. 600 
 
 
 
As can be seen from the previous graph, the net gains from internationalization initially 
decrease while the firm learns to limit its liability of foreignness and newness and attempts to 
control its coordination costs (all these add up to “total costs of internationalization”). Once 
the firm overcomes its initial total costs of internationalization its net gains start to rise up to 
a point where the total costs of internationalization become larger than the net gains (Lu and 
Beamish, 2004). We identify this effect in other major theories such as in the Uppsala stage-
model of diversification where firms end up retreating after having committed major 
international ventures given unforeseen loses from geographical diversification (Johanson 
and Vahlne, 1977). Having major theme parks in all the relevant continents, it is expected 
that Disney will be located near or at the peak point of its internationalization process.  
International Modes of Entry: The Case of Disney 
 
Page | 27  
 
7 Research Method 
Research on Disney’s international modes of entry was based on a deductive approach where 
the explanation of the causal relationships between the relevant variables (foreign market 
conditions and entry mode) was explained by going from general theory of 
internationalisation to particular information on the actual decisions taken by Disney. 
The nature of the study was descripto-explanatory given the need to portray four different but 
highly intertwined cases (Tokyo, Paris, Hong Kong and China) while attempting to establish 
causal relationships between the variables that influence international modes of entry 
decisions.  
The research strategy was based on the creation of independent case studies for each 
international mode of entry decision made by Disney. Case studies are a strategy for doing 
research which involves an empirical investigation of a particular contemporary phenomenon 
within its real life context using multiple sources of evidence (Robson, 2002:178). In this 
case the particular contemporary phenomenon studied is the decision by Disney to select a 
licensing contract in Tokyo, a WOS in Paris and Joint Ventures for Hong Kong and China.   
Sources of evidence for the investigation were mainly of secondary nature, such as: 
• Newspapers 
• Corporate websites 
• Academic journals 
• Conference proceedings 
• Specialized books 
• Stock exchange filings  
• Press releases 
• Annual reports 
The research project is cross-sectional given that performance of the Disney Theme Park 
division was studied from 1983, date of the Tokyo entrance, all the way into the present, 
representing a total of 28 years, and this performance was analyzed today, at one point in 
time.  
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8 Case Studies: Tokyo, Paris, Hong Kong and Shanghai 
The case studies of Tokyo, Paris, Hong Kong and Shanghai are presented in this section in 
the order of their inauguration. Each case and its hypotheses were developed in such a way as 
to make them understandable independently of the others.  
8.1 First venture abroad: Tokyo Disneyland 
On April 15, 1983 Tokyo Disneyland (TDL), the first international Disney theme park, 
opened on reclaimed shallow areas of Tokyo Bay. Nowadays, with over 17 million visitors a 
year and more than 45 rides covering an area of 115 acres, Tokyo Disneyland ranks as one of 
the most highly visited theme parks in the world. By the end of the 1980s Tokyo Disneyland 
beat a record as it was the only Disney Park able to attract more than 15 million visitors a 
year. In the year 1989, thanks to the licensing agreement with TDL, Disney received royalties 
amounting to $573 million – a considerable figure given that it exceeded the operating 
income received from both Disney’s US theme parks (Raz, 1999). 
Tokyo Disneyland is owned and operated by a Japanese company, Oriental Land Company 
Limited (OLCL), which is a conglomerate of several distinct Japanese companies. In the mid-
1960s OLCL’s main objective was to exploit the area of the Tokyo Bay, since such land was 
ordered by the Japanese government to be utilized for “leisure” purposes only. It was at this 
point that OLCL sent study teams around the world to determine the best use for the land. 
After one of the teams visited the California Disneyland the decision was made to approach 
Disney with an offer to open a Disneyland in Japan. The company was interested but at the 
time was busy developing the Florida Park. Moreover, top managers at Disney were deeply 
concerned about building a Disney theme park in a country with a completely different 
culture and viewed the venture as too risky, and they were probably right (Raz, 1999). 
The two parties came out with a licensing agreement that would render OLCL exposed to all 
the risks while leaving Disney safe. OLCL was licensed by Disney to use its trademarks, 
intellectual property and engineering designs for rides. In return Disney would receive 
royalties of 10% on the admissions revenues and 5% on sales of food, beverages and 
souvenirs while also providing ongoing technical assistance to OLCL  (Raz, 1999). 
Despite common knowledge, Tokyo Disneyland is more a Japanese product than a perfect 
copy of the American style. The fact that Tokyo Disneyland is owned by a Japanese company 
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caused the Tokyo Park to adhere almost perfectly to local regulations and customs. 
Therefore, Tokyo Disneyland did not face all the issues that generally arise with other forms 
of international activities and entering the Japanese market was overall a smooth process. A 
licensing agreement, given Disney’s lack of knowledge of the local market, was the right 
choice.  
When Disney approved the licensing agreement its management was conscious of the risk 
posed by entering a different market. One of the most appropriate frameworks that could be 
used in order to investigate the cultural differences existing between the US and Japan is 
Hofstede’s “Four Dimensions of Culture”.  
In terms of the Power Distance Index (PDI), Japanese are willing to accept higher levels of 
hierarchical power than in the US. One of the cases exemplifying this dimension is the 
adaptation that Tokyo Disneyland had to implement when it asked employees to show last 
names rather than first names in their personal ID tags as it was done in the US theme parks 
(Van Maanen, 2003). From a cultural perspective a licensing agreement was the right choice 
given the large differences between the two cultures and Disney’s lack of knowledge about 
the country.  
Figure 11. Hofstede 
“Five Dimensions of 
Culture”. Japan Vs. US 
PDI: Power Distance 
Index 
IDV: Individuality Index 
MAS: Masculinity Index 
UAI: Uncertainty 
Avoidance Index 
LTO: Long Term 
Orientation Index 
 
 
 
Source:  Hofstede’s 
official website, 
consulted on February, 
28th 2011. 
 
 
 
A licensing agreement is an entry mode characterised by low risk and development costs. By 
choosing this method the company didn’t face any tangible risks. It is possible to say that the 
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construction and the entry strategies chosen for Tokyo Disneyland were entirely a burden of 
OLCL. The licensing agreement as a non-equity entry mode gave Disney considerable 
Ownership advantages in the sense that it allowed the company to leverage its unique 
resources –refer to the VRIO Framework- in a fast, relatively risk-free way and at a fraction 
of the cost. 
Nonetheless, the company forfeited internalization advantages because it had little exposure 
to international activities other than handling the licensing contract with OLCL. Moreover, 
this mode of entry produced a lack of control over the delivery and marketing of the Disney 
experience that the US Company tried to overcome, at least partially, by sending a small 
American management team (called Disnoids) to Japan. Their task is to act as advisors and 
consultants in order to keep the Tokyo Park in tune with the Disney doctrine (Van Maanen, 
2003). 
The company clearly lost locational advantages since it is not directly operating the venture 
in Japan. All the advantages derived from the abundance of strong market demand and the 
willingness of customers to pay goes directly to licensee, Disney receives only a small 
percentage of this advantage through royalties.  
Having learnt  how to leverage its resources abroad through the most basic mode of entry 
Disney felt that it was now ready to jump steps and to take an ownership position in its next 
venture, Disneyland Paris, and exploit directly its unique model without sharing any of the 
revenue.  
8.1.1 Hypotheses analysis for Tokyo 
According to the Uppsala Model of Internationalisation (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977), firms 
often develop their international operations in small steps, rather than by making large 
foreign investments at single points in time. This was certainly the case of Disney, who opted 
for a licensing agreement instead of attempting to conquer by itself a market characterised by 
having a large psychic distance from the United States. We can therefore confirm hypothesis 
one for Tokyo Disneyland: 
1. Disney’s venture into Tokyo via licensing agreements is consistent with the Uppsala 
Model of Internationalisation given the high psychic distance between both countries 
and Disney’s lack of knowledge about the region. 
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In terms of Transaction Cost Economics, ex-ante (negotiating contracts) and ex-post costs 
(monitoring) may or may not exceed the costs of organizing the transaction internally. 
Moreover, different governance structures will have different levels of transactions costs and 
asset specificity. Given the low ex-ante and ex-post transaction costs involved in dealing with 
a developed country such as Japan (respectful of contracts and aware of property rights), it is 
consistent for Disney to have chosen licensing agreements instead of a governance structure 
with higher levels of control. This decision saved Disney costs of complexity and monitoring 
that would have been exceedingly high for a company that was just starting its 
internationalisation process. 
Figure 8-1. Governance costs 
as a function of Asset 
Specificity for Tokyo 
Disneyland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Adapted from: Williamson (1981, 
1985), Teece (1986) 
 
 
 
2. Disney’s decision to profit from its unique assets externally via licensing agreements 
is consistent with the TCE approach to internationalisation given the savings 
achieved in complexity and monitoring.  
In order to generate competitive advantage, a firm’s resources have to be valuable, rare, 
imperfectly inimitable and non-substitutable (Barney, 1997). According the Resource-based 
view of the firm transferability of resources and capabilities is easier with equity-based 
modes of entry than with non-equity-based ones. Most entry modes are effective in 
preserving the value of transferred resources and capabilities; it is the level of efficiency 
(partner’s absorptive capacity) that varies the most. Given that Disney was able to find a 
committed Japanese partner who was able to transfer its value-generating resources while 
making important local adaptations without eroding value confirms that choosing a licensing 
agreement was a good decision from the outset and one that increased the company’s 
resources and capabilities for the whole company.  
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3. Disney decision to enter the Japanese market via a licensing agreement is consistent 
with the Resource-Based view of the firm given its ability to find an efficient local 
partner with high absorptive capacity that was able to transfer and adapt advantage 
generating resources without erosion in value.  
Institutional theory analyses how companies enter and operate in an institutional environment 
defined by certain rules, norms, and values (Davis, Desai, and Francis, 2000). A relevant 
feature of institutional theory is internal and external isomorphism: the pressures to imitate 
the parent or local firms in order to best tailor the needs of headquarters or the host market, 
respectively. Given the large institutional differences between the US and Japanese market, 
Disney’s decision to favour a licensing agreement is consistent with institutional theory given 
the high pressures for external isomorphism of the Japanese market.  
4. Disney’s selection of a licensing agreement is consistent with the institutional theory 
of internationalisation given the high pressures for external isomorphism in the 
Japanese market and the need to contractually ensure the effective transfer of the 
“Disney Flavour” (internal isomorphism). 
Culture refers to the ‘‘collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members 
of one category of people from those of another’’ (Hofstede, 1984, p. 389). Kogut and Singh 
(1988) suggested that the effect of national culture on the choice of entry mode is likely to 
have profound implications. Disney, coming from a very diverse home country, was correct 
in his decision to enter the Japanese market via a licensing agreement given the large cultural 
differences between both countries. 
5. Disney’s selection of a licensing agreement is consistent with Cultural Distance 
Theory due to the large cultural differences with the host country and lack of similar 
cultural experiences in the region. Thus, cultural distance alone is sufficient to 
explain Disney’s decision.   
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Table 8-1 Aggregated Results for Tokyo 
Framework Tokyo 
Uppsala Stage Process Yes 
TCE Yes 
Resource-Based View Yes 
Institutional  
Theory 
Yes 
Cultural Distance 
Theory 
Yes 
 
As can be verified from the previous table, Tokyo Disneyland was not only a success from a 
financial point of view, but also from a management perspective. The right tools to enter the 
Japanese market and this positively influenced performance.  
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8.2 Gaining confidence: Disneyland Paris 
Until 1992, the Walt Disney theme parks in California, Florida and Japan had experienced 
nothing but success. Encouraged by the strong sales of Disney licensed products in the 
European market, in 1986 Disney executives started to evaluate the alternative of opening a 
European-based theme park in the belief that Disney “magic”, which had been so 
successfully exported in Japan, was sure to repeat itself in Europe. Among viable locations 
were Great Britain, Italy, Spain and France. Britain and Italy were dropped from the list 
because they lacked suitable land. Spain offered a better climate, but locating the park in 
France showed significant advantages in terms of supporting infrastructures, government 
subsidies and tourism affluence, since its capital, Paris, is the most visited European 
destination (Forbes, 2007).  
It was in March 24th, 1987 that the Walt Disney Company signed an agreement with the 
Republic of France for the creation of Euro Disneyland. For this purpose, a wholly-owned 
subsidiary, called Euro Disneyland SCA, was incorporated as a French corporation and listed 
in the London Stock Exchange. In fact Euro Disneyland is not exactly a WOS since Disney 
nowadays only controls 39% of the company. Nonetheless, Disney remains the majority 
shareholder and commands total control of the company’s operations (Grant, 2008). 
Nevertheless, the theme park was not an immediate success. One prominent French 
intellectual defined the transplantation of Disney park as “a cultural Chernobyl” 
(Mnouchkine, 1992), and many cultural conflicts arose before and after the opening, on April 
12th 1992, of the 5 billion dollar venture.  
The first phase of development had gone over budget. Nevertheless, the park showed 
sluggish attendance figures over its first months, and by May 1992 it was only attracting 
25,000 visitors per day, instead of the predicted 60,000 (Walt Disney Company Press release, 
1992). The company invested billions in building luxury hotels next to the park, which turned 
out to be empty most of the times since visitors were not willing to spend additional money to 
visit an area that could be explored in a day trip from Paris. This situation was worsened by 
the fact that only 3 out of 10 visitors were native French and the remaining were, 
surprisingly, Americans living in Europe or Japanese on a European vacation (Grant, 2008).  
The European recession in 1992 caused property prices to drop, and prevented Euro Disney 
from sustaining revenues through land sales. Hence, the massive interest payments on the 
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start-up loans taken out by Euro Disney turned the company into financial difficulties and the 
company’s stock price started a downward spiral. Moreover, the cheap dollar persuaded more 
and more people to forego Europe in favour of holidays in the US parks. By the end of 1993, 
Euro Disney had cumulative losses of 2 billion dollars (Walt Disney Press Release, 1993), 
and there were rumours that the park was about to close. 
In 1994, Prince al-Waleed, a billionaire from Saudi Arabia decided to purchase a 24% share -
eventually decreased to 17%- of the debt-ridden Euro Disney, allowing the company to 
withstand the European recession and continue building despite the increased debt ratio. It is 
worth mentioning that many analysts attribute Euro Disney’s future success to the Prince al-
Waleed’s investment (Disney Press Release 1994). The financial imbalances of Euro Disney 
were attributed to the high costs committed to adapt the American model to sophisticated 
European tastes. Disney simply was not able to overcome its liability of foreignness and 
newness in the new market (Grant, 2008).  
The local adaptations added significant costs to Disney business model. Park attractions were 
planned to accommodate the French and European culture and many of them were unique to 
Euro Disney (e.g. attractions based on themes inspired by European famous artists such as 
Jules Verne and Leonardo da Vinci). Disney dealt with European queuing concerns by 
providing entertainment, movies and video screens for people waiting in line. A huge amount 
of money was spent on building French-style restaurants, placing less emphasis on American 
fast foods. Nonetheless, when customers were asked to choose between sophistication or 
lower prices, they opted for the latter (Grant, 2008). In fact, visitors preferred fast foods and 
the same rides as in the US parks. It was clear that Euro Disney needed to change its strategy.  
In 1994, executives significantly cut operational costs and lowered the prices for daily 
entrance tickets and hotel rooms. On the marketing and communication side, the name of the 
park was changed to Disneyland Paris in order to show a stronger identification with the city 
of Paris and a new advertising campaign was launched in order to make people aware of the 
changes. Nowadays, Disneyland Paris shows successful figures and has overcome all of the 
past strategic problems. With its 15.3 million visits in 2008 it is nowadays one of the most 
visited tourist destinations in Europe (Grant, 2008). Disney finally was able to adapt to the 
local culture, but not without significant costs that could have been avoided with other entry 
modes like joint ventures.  
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The French government played a key role in Disney’s eventual success. The venture was 
welcomed by the French government which, since the beginning, committed itself to the 
development of the project. Among the other facilitations, the French government sold 
Disney approximately 4.400 acres of land in Marne-la-Valle at farmland price, lent Disney 
US$ 770 million at favourable interest rates, financed much of the transport infrastructure at 
the park and set the VAT payments for Disney at 5.5% instead of 18.6% (Company Website). 
From an institutional perspective it made sense for Disney to dismiss alternative modes of 
entry given the unconditional support of the government.   
In France, FDI regulations are simple and attractive to foreign investors. The French 
government has established several regulatory frameworks which promote the establishment 
of foreign companies. So far, the development of Euro Disney, considered one of the hugest 
investments in Europe by an American company, was facilitated by a developed form of 
formal institutions.  
Many of the cultural problems that Euro Disney experienced could be analyzed using 
Hofstede’s “Four Dimensions of Culture” (1984). The following analysis compares Hofstede 
cultural dimensions for the US against those of France. The US has a PDI score of 40, which 
is 27% lower than the world average and is characterized by flat organization structures, a 
smaller proportion of supervisors and by employees empowered to make their own decisions. 
France scores 68 points on the PDI which is 24% higher than the world average. Higher PDI 
societies have hierarchical organization structures featuring a high proportion of supervisors 
that give orders to the lowest levels. In fact, the French were confused when Disney 
appointed mostly American managers in the front-line supervisory positions at Euro 
Disneyland, many of whom were not even fluent in French. Furthermore, American 
managers required English spoken at all meetings. The lack of effective communication led 
to major mistakes in the park theme operations. 
American Individualism score of 91 is the highest in the world. France’s score of 71 is high 
as well, 65% more than the world average. Paradoxically, cultures characterized by high level 
of individualism believe that there is only one set of correct values, while collectivist cultures 
admit different ideas among different groups. American executives imposed a strict dress 
code at Euro Disney that required extremely short hair and banned beards and moustaches. 
French employees perceived that the Americans, by imposing the Disney appearance code, 
were insulting their traditions and identities. 
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Figure 12. Hofstede “Five 
Dimensions of Culture”. 
France Vs. US 
PDI: Power Distance Index 
IDV: Individuality Index 
MAS: Masculinity Index 
UAI: Uncertainty Avoidance 
Index 
LTO: Long Term 
Orientation Index 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Hofstede’s official 
website, consulted on 
February, 28th 2011. 
 
 
 
The large differences in culture called for a different entry mode than a Wholly Owned 
Subsidiary. Other types, like a joint venture with a local company, would have allowed for 
different voices to be heard that could have avoided the initial business failure that Euro 
Disney was.  
In the Euro Disney case, the choice of a wholly-owned subsidiary as an equity entry mode 
involved high costs for building the park, huge operational expenses, and high risks due to 
running the business in an unfamiliar environment. Nonetheless, this entry decision allowed 
the company to gain Ownership, Internalization and Locational advantages at the same time.  
The Ownership advantages of Disneyland Paris are mainly reputational and first mover 
advantages which render the theme park unique in the customer’s mind. Furthermore, it is 
worth mentioning that, given the uniqueness of the Disney product, there are no potential 
competitors in the European arena. These factors give the company the possibility to charge a 
premium price for the final customer.  
In terms of Locational advantages France offered unique transportation facilities, qualified 
labour and access to a big potential market, justifying an investment in the region over other 
options.  
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The decision of pursuing a WOS allowed Disney to save on high transaction costs like the 
ones experienced in the licensing contract with Japan. This Internalization advantages were 
the prevention of knowledge leakages, the cost savings of not having to enforce a contract 
with a third party and the avoidance of opportunistic behaviour. Moreover, this decision 
allowed the company to gain a practical understanding of how to run a theme park abroad. 
Finally, as Teece suggested (1986), by internalizing market transactions the company still has 
to deal with the government which as a consequence adds an extra layer of costs. 
8.2.1 Hypotheses analysis for Paris 
According to the Uppsala Model of Internationalisation (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977), firms 
often develop their international operations in small steps, rather than by making large 
foreign investments at single points in time. After the successful experience of Tokyo 
Disneyland, Disney felt that it was ready to jump steps and implement a corporate 
governance structure with higher levels of commitment when it simply was not ready. Thus 
Disney’s venture into the French market is not consistent with the Uppsala Model of 
Internationalisation given that a hybrid mode of entry was advisable.  
1. Disney’s venture into France via a Wholly Owned Subsidiary is NOT consistent with 
the Uppsala Model of Internationalisation given the high psychic distance between 
both countries and  the lack of relevant experience abroad and local knowledge. 
In terms of Transaction Cost Economics, ex-ante (negotiating contracts) and ex-post costs 
(monitoring) may or may not exceed the costs of organizing the transaction internally. 
Furthermore, different governance structures will have different levels of transactions costs 
and asset specificity. Given the relatively low ex-ante and ex-post transaction costs involved 
in dealing within a developed country such as France (respectful of contracts and aware of 
property rights), it is NOT consistent for Disney to have chosen a WOS when it could have 
chosen a hybrid governance structure with lower levels of commitment that would have 
allowed the company to better adapt, from the outset, to the unique needs of the French 
market.  
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Figure 8-2. Governance costs 
as a function of Asset 
Specificity for Disneyland 
Paris 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Adapted from: Williamson (1981, 
1985), Teece (1986) 
 
 
 
2. Disney’s decision to profit from its unique assets internally via a Wholly Owned 
Subsidiary is NOT consistent with the TCE approach to internationalisation given 
that it was not necessary to maintain such a high level of control from the outset.  
In order to generate competitive advantage, a firm’s resources have to be valuable, rare, 
imperfectly inimitable and non-substitutable (Barney, 1997). According the Resource-based 
view of the firm transferability of resources and capabilities is easier with equity-based 
modes of entry than with non-equity-based ones. Most entry modes are effective in 
preserving the value of transferred resources and capabilities; it is the level of efficiency 
(partner’s absorptive capacity) that varies the most. What was needed in Disneyland Paris 
was a local partner that was able to adapt Disney’s resources and capabilities to the local 
environment. Therefore the Resource-based view is not fully supported for Disneyland Paris 
given that resources and capabilities were not fully developed by this choice.  
3. Disney decision to enter the French market via a WOS is NOT consistent with the 
Resource-Based view of the firm given that there was a real need for a local partner 
to effectively and efficiently transfer advantage-generating resources without eroding 
value. Moreover, it was feasible to find such a partner in France’s developed market.  
Institutional theory analyses how companies enter and operate in an institutional environment 
defined by certain rules, norms, and values (Davis, Desai, and Francis, 2000). A relevant 
feature of institutional theory is internal and external isomorphism: the pressures to imitate 
the parent or local firms in order to best tailor the needs of headquarters or the host market, 
respectively. Given the large institutional differences between the US and France, Disney’s 
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selection of a WOS as an entry mode is NOT consistent with institutional theory because the 
high pressures for external isomorphism were utterly neglected.  
4. Disney’s selection of a WOS is NOT consistent with the institutional theory of 
internationalisation given that the company ignored high pressures for external 
isomorphism in the French market in order to accommodate its high pressures for 
internal isomorphism. Only hybrid structures are able to cover to both needs 
simultaneously.   
Culture refers to the ‘‘collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members 
of one category of people from those of another’’ (Hofstede, 1984, p. 389). Kogut and Singh 
(1988) suggested that the effect of national culture on the choice is likely to have profound 
implications. The cultural differences between the US and France are high and it was a 
mistake for Disneyland to settle for a WOS when other governance structures with lower 
levels of commitment would have allowed for better adaptation to local needs.  
5. Disney’s selection of a WOS is NOT consistent with Cultural Distance Theory due to 
the large cultural differences with the host country. Cultural differences alone would 
have provided a recommendation for a hybrid structure.   
Table 8-2 Aggregated Results for Paris 
Framework Paris 
Uppsala Stage Process No 
TCE No 
Resource-Based View No 
Institutional Theory No 
Cultural Distance Theory No 
 
In general Disney stayed off-path in the Paris venture. Over-confidence from the Japanese 
experience combined with greed cause the company to settle for an inefficient entry mode.  
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8.3 Mature phase: Hong Kong Disneyland 
Back in 1999, the Hong Kong government announced plans for a Disney theme park 
construction in the area. Hong Kong Disneyland finally opened in 2005 and it has been 
operated by Hong Kong International Theme Parks, a company jointly owned by the 
Government of Hong Kong and Disney.  
The investment in the Hong Kong theme park is over HK$14 billion, with the Hong Kong 
Government owning 57% and Disney the rest. The theme park’s board of directors has 11 
members. The Hong Kong Government appoints five directors while Disney names four of 
them. Two independent non-executive directors are jointly appointed by the Hong Kong 
Government and Disney. Chairmanship rotates annually between the government-appointed 
directors and the Disney-appointed directors. The management team is composed by people 
with many years of experience in the company and from several backgrounds and 
nationalities.  
The park plays an active role in its community by constantly operating programs that benefit 
it, like donating trees or giving free tickets for special occasions. Although the theme park is 
still in its first years and attendance was low at the beginning -it actually missed its visitors 
target in each of the first two years- (Kwok 2009), it has recently been reported that overnight 
travellers with children or grandchildren increased by 22% from 2006 to 2007. 
Contrary to the experiences in Tokyo (licensing agreement) and Paris (WOS), Disney 
selected a joint venture as entry mode for Hong Kong. This entry mode is an option between 
a licensing agreement and a WOS, with its own advantages and disadvantages. The main 
benefit of a joint venture is, in this case, the close relationship with the local government that 
Disney is developing. Asia is a complicated market and it usually pays to not only have the 
government on your side, but to have it as a major investor. It also benefits the venture to 
have a local partner with deep knowledge of traditions and customs. Thus, from and 
institutional and cultural point of view the selection of a joint venture was justified.  
A major disadvantage for the Hong Kong venture is that the company is not the majority 
shareholder in the joint company and it is somehow dependent on the Hong Kong 
government for major decisions. Moreover, other investments that might be beneficial for 
Disney as a whole might be detrimental for the joint venture and cause problems with the 
partner, as will probably be the case with Disney’s plans to open a Shanghai theme park since 
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it will take away a substantial market share from the Hong Kong Park. This example reflects 
many of the challenges arising from joint ventures. 
One of the major risks of joint ventures is the probability of a partner stealing the other’s 
capabilities in order to later compete on its own. This is clearly a risk for the Hong Kong 
theme park and even more for the Chinese one. Nonetheless, Disney’s resources and 
capabilities are so rare and inimitable that this risk should not be reason enough for 
considering other options. In other words, technology risk is almost non-existent for Disney, 
since other companies might copy the rides, but they will never be able to copy the Disney 
experience.   
Figure 11. Hofstede “Five 
Dimensions of Culture”. 
Hong Kong Vs. US 
PDI: Power Distance Index 
IDV: Individuality Index 
MAS: Masculinity Index 
UAI: Uncertainty 
Avoidance Index 
LTO: Long Term 
Orientation Index 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Hofstede’s 
official website, consulted 
on February, 28th 2011. 
 
 
 
Finally, a joint venture seems to be the best course of action for Hong Kong given the high 
cultural distances between those locations and the United States. A local partner, in the way 
of a local government, seems better suited to deal with local traditions than the American 
company. Moreover, joint ventures are a great opportunity for Disney to learn more about 
these markets and maybe run a new park by itself in the future (in South Korea or Indonesia, 
for example).  
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8.3.1 Hypotheses analysis for Hong Kong 
According to the Uppsala Model of Internationalisation (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977), firms often 
develop their international operations in small steps, rather than by making large foreign 
investments at single points in time. The model also foresees the option of reversing the 
internationalisation process in case of overexpansion. Disney clearly jumped steps when 
moving directly to a WOS in Paris after having only a licensing agreement in Tokyo as 
experience abroad. The decision to settle for a Joint Venture in Hong Kong is clearly 
consistent with the Uppsala Model of Internationalisation, from both the point of view of a 
normal internationalisation process and as a reversal due to overextension.  
1. Disney’s venture into Hong Kong via a Joint Venture is consistent with the Uppsala Model of 
Internationalisation given the high psychic distance between both countries and lack of 
relevant experience abroad. It is also consistent with the model as an example of reversal of 
commitments due to overexpansion.  
In terms of Transaction Cost Economics, ex-ante (negotiating contracts) and ex-post costs 
(monitoring) may or may not exceed the costs of organizing the transaction internally. 
Furthermore, different governance structures will have different levels of transactions costs 
and asset specificity. Given the relatively high ex-ante and ex-post transaction costs involved 
in dealing with partner in Hong Kong, but also the higher costs of operating in a highly 
different foreign market, Disney’s decision to settle for a Joint Venture is consistent with the 
TCE approach. 
Figure 8-3. Governance costs 
as a function of Asset 
Specificity for Hong Kong 
Disneyland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Adapted from: Williamson (1981, 
1985), Teece (1986) 
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2. Disney’s decision to profit from its unique assets via a Joint Venture is consistent with the 
TCE approach to internationalisation not only because of high transaction costs, but also 
because of the challenge of operating in a different foreign environment.  
In order to generate competitive advantage, a firm’s resources have to be valuable, rare, 
imperfectly inimitable and non-substitutable (Barney, 1997). According the Resource-based 
view of the firm transferability of resources and capabilities is easier with equity-based 
modes of entry than with non-equity-based ones. Most entry modes are effective in 
preserving the value of transferred resources and capabilities; it is the level of efficiency 
(partner’s absorptive capacity) that varies the most. Disney’s “in-between” decision to enter 
the Hong Kong market with a Joint Venture is consistent with the Resource-based view given 
the feasibility to transfer value-generating resources and capabilities while allowing a local 
partner with high absorptive capacity to adapt for unique local conditions without eroding 
value.  
3. Disney’s decision to enter the Hong Kong market via a Joint Venture is consistent 
with the Resource-Based view of the firm given that there was a real need for a local 
partner to “adapt”, not just transfer, its value-generating resources and capabilities 
without eroding value.  
Institutional theory analyses how companies enter and operate in an institutional environment 
defined by certain rules, norms, and values (Davis, Desai, and Francis, 2000). A relevant 
feature of institutional theory is internal and external isomorphism: the pressures to imitate 
the parent or local firms in order to best tailor the needs of headquarters or the host market, 
respectively. The company’s decision to enter the Hong Kong market via a Joint Venture is 
consistent with the Institutional Theory given the need to properly mimic local conditions 
while keeping the “Disney flavour”.   
4. Disney’s selection of a Joint Venture is consistent with the institutional theory of 
market entry given the high pressures for external isomorphism in the French market 
and the equally high pressures for internal isomorphism (maintaining Disney 
flavour).  
Culture refers to the ‘‘collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members 
of one category of people from those of another’’ (Hofstede, 1984, p. 389). Kogut and Singh 
(1988) suggested that the effect of national culture on the choice is likely to have profound 
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implications. The cultural differences between the US and Hong Kong are high, thus 
confirming Disney’s decision to select a Joint Venture as a mode of entry.   
5. Disney’s selection of a Joint Venture is consistent with Cultural Distance Theory 
given the large cultural differences with the host country. Cultural differences alone 
were a sufficient reason to choose a hybrid structure.   
Table 8-3 Aggregated Results for Hong Kong 
Framework Hong Kong 
Uppsala Stage Process Yes 
TCE Yes 
Resource-Based View Yes 
Institutional Theory Yes 
Cultural Distance Theory Yes 
 
Disney learnt its lesson and corrected its internationalisation approach for its Hong Kong 
venture. A hybrid approach was the right entry mode and this reflected in positive 
performance for the company.  
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8.4 The future: Shanghai Disneyland 
“Shanghai Disneyland will be authentically Disney and distinctly Chinese” 
The Walt Disney Company 
 
Although details have not been properly diffused, it is known that the Chinese government 
approved plans to develop a Disneyland theme park in Shanghai on November 4, 2009, 
shortly after a visit of the current President of the United States of America, Barack Obama. 
The park is expected to be operational by 2015 and at 3.9 square kilometres it will be 2-3 
times the larger than Hong Kong Disneyland.  
The exact location of Shanghai Disneyland will be at Pudong New District, quite close to 
Shanghai’s city centre. In fact, 330 million possible visitors live within a three-hour drive or 
train ride from the park. Shanghai Disneyland will include signature Disney ride that are 
common around the world as well as many new elements tailored specifically for Chinese 
people and unique to the Shanghai Disney Resort. In many ways this project represents a 
good example of Disney’s challenging task to be American and Chinese at the same time. 
Disneyland Shanghai will be a joint venture between Disney and the Shanghai Shendi Group, 
a 100% state-owned Chinese company. As part of the agreement, Shanghai Shendi Group 
will hold 57% of the shares and Disney the remaining 43%. Although it is mandatory by law 
to enter the Chinese market with a joint venture with a local company, the selection of a JV 
makes sense from several perspectives given the great differences between both cultures. 
From an Institutional Theory standpoint it makes sense to team up with the government. 
Nonetheless, from a Resource-Based approach such a move might jeopardize an effective and 
efficient transfer of resources and capabilities. Disney’s decision is controversial and all 
theories of internationalisation have to be consulted in order to understand it.   
Disney gained a large amount of knowledge about the Asian market from its operations in 
Disneyland Hong Kong. In theory it should be capable of running the park by itself, but the 
power and influence of the Chinese government is so high that a joint venture seems to be the 
less risky option. However, the value of the government as a partner is questioned given the 
limited contributions that it would be able to bring to the new venture, besides its money and 
official blessing. Disney might encounter difficulties adapting to the local market if the 
government agency is simply not up to the task, as a private partner would be.  
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The total investment in the park would be around $3.59 billion dollars and it would be the 
company’s fourth international venture after Tokyo, Paris and Hong Kong. The project will 
be completely financed by 7 Chinese banks, which illustrates the benefits and challenges of 
conducting business with such a powerful local government. With so much weight in the 
project being hold by the Chinese government it is not unreasonable to assume that Disney 
will have difficulties maintaining its “Disney flavour” in China.  
Figure 11. Hofstede “Five 
Dimensions of Culture”. 
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Avoidance Index 
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8.4.1 Hypotheses analysis for Shanghai 
According to the Uppsala Model of Internationalisation (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977), firms often 
develop their international operations in small steps, rather than by making large foreign 
investments at single points in time. Having gained substantial experience abroad, especially 
in the Asia region, Disney should be able to enter the Chinese market by itself or with the 
help of a minority partner in a Joint Venture. Disney’s “forced” decision to enter China via a 
minority JV with the Chinese government is therefore not consistent the Uppsala Model of 
Internationalisation since higher levels of commitment would have been expected.  
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1. Disney’s venture in Shanghai via a 57% Chinese Government /43% Disney Joint Venture is 
NOT consistent with the Uppsala Model of Internationalisation given the now lower psychic 
distance between the two countries due to the firm’s extensive experience in Asia. A Joint 
Venture with high higher levels of commitment, or at least 50%-50%, would have been more 
adequate.  
In terms of Transaction Cost Economics, ex-ante (negotiating contracts) and ex-post costs 
(monitoring) may or may not exceed the costs of organizing the transaction internally. 
Furthermore, different governance structures will have different levels of transactions costs 
and asset specificity. Given the high ex-ante and ex-post transaction costs involved in dealing 
in the Chinese market, plus the equally high costs of operating in a different foreign market 
combined with high contractual hazards (high asset specificity), Disney’s decision to settle 
for a Joint Venture is not consistent with the TCE approach. This conclusion is consistent 
with the one derived from the Uppsala Model of Internationalisation.  
Figure 8-4. Governance costs 
as a function of Asset 
Specificity for Shanghai 
Disneyland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Adapted from: Williamson (1981, 
1985), Teece (1986) 
 
 
 
The fact that Disney was “forced” into a JV with the Chinese government does not justify the 
project from a TCE perspective. Disney still had the option of withdrawing from the venture 
itself and venture somewhere else. The TCE perspective would only make sense if the 
company expects abnormal profits that would justify selecting an entry mode with higher 
transaction costs. Still, other venues around the world would have provided the same amount 
of profits without having to accept contractual conditions that could jeopardize the entire 
project. This situation is comparable to the one suffered by Shell when its investments in the 
Russian Sakhalin project went awry.  
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2. Disney’s decision to profit from its unique assets via a minority Joint Venture is not 
consistent with the TCE approach to internationalisation given that high contractual hazards 
in China would have justified higher levels of control, such as a majority JV or a WOS.  
In order to generate competitive advantage, a firm’s resources have to be valuable, rare, 
imperfectly inimitable and non-substitutable (Barney, 1997). According the Resource-based 
view of the firm transferability of resources and capabilities is easier with equity-based 
modes of entry than with non-equity-based ones. Most entry modes are effective in 
preserving the value of transferred resources and capabilities; it is the level of efficiency 
(partner’s absorptive capacity) that varies the most. Disney’s selection of a minority Joint 
Venture with the local government is not consistent with the theory as this will seriously 
jeopardize the company’s ability to effectively and efficiently transfer and adapt value-
generating resources and capabilities. A private local partner would have been a better 
choice, but obviously the company had little choice in this regard due to the aggressive 
institutional environment (see next hypothesis). The only case where it would make sense 
from a RBV perspective would be if Disney’s ultimate purpose was to learn how to operate in 
difficult markets such as China. For this reason the RBV hypotheses is only partly 
inconsistent.  
3. Disney’s decision to enter China via a minority Joint Venture with the local 
government is partly NOT consistent with the Resource-Based view of the firm given 
the obstacle that cooperating with a partner with low absorptive capacity would 
represent in effectively transferring and adapting resources and capabilities without 
eroding value. It makes sense if the purpose is to develop the capabilities to operate in 
difficult environments such as China.  
Institutional theory analyses how companies enter and operate in an institutional environment 
defined by certain rules, norms, and values (Davis, Desai, and Francis, 2000). A relevant 
feature of institutional theory is internal and external isomorphism: the pressures to imitate 
the parent or local firms in order to best tailor the needs of headquarters or the host market, 
respectively. Disney has a strong need to properly mimic the Chinese environment in order to 
fit in, but this might come at the risk of not maintaining the Disney flavour in the new market 
due to the high influence that the Chinese government will have in the venture. Thus, 
Disney’s decision is considered to partly confirm the institutional approach to market entry 
given that a private partner would have been a better choice to mimic the local market.  
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4. Disney’s selection of a minority Joint Venture with the Chinese Government is partly 
consistent with institutional theory given the unusually high pressures for external 
isomorphism in the Chinese market. A private Chinese would have been better.  
Kogut and Singh (1988) suggested that the effect of national culture on the choice is likely to 
have profound implications. The cultural differences between the US and China are quite 
large, implying that Disney’s decision to select a Joint Venture as a mode of entry is 
consistent with the cultural approach to market entry.    
5. Disney’s selection of a Joint Venture is consistent with Cultural Distance theory given 
the large cultural differences with the host country. Cultural difference alone would 
have recommended a hybrid structure as a solution.   
Table 8-4 Aggregated Results for China 
Framework China 
Uppsala Stage Process No 
TCE No 
Resource-Based View 
No 
(partly) 
Institutional Theory 
Yes 
(partly) 
Cultural Distance Theory Yes 
 
The Chinese venture is a complex one. The fact that Disney was forced into a minority Joint 
Venture with the Chinese government complicates the analysis and illustrates the benefit of 
using several perspectives. While the Uppsala Model and TCE approaches offer negative 
results, the RBV and Institutional Theory present new insights. On the one hand, the China 
venture is an opportunity to learn how to conduct business in harsh environments, thus partly 
supporting the RBV. On the other, Institutional Theory justifies a JV with the Chinese 
government given the abnormally high pressures for local isomorphism. Cultural Distance 
Theory would have provided a similar answer, regardless of all the other paradigms.  
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9 Aggregated Results for Disney 
The following is a summary table of the hypotheses analysed. 
Table 9-1 Aggregated Results 
Framework Tokyo Paris Hong Kong China 
Uppsala Stage 
Process 
Yes No Yes No 
TCE Yes No Yes No 
Resource-Based 
View 
Yes No Yes 
No 
(partly) 
Institutional  
Theory 
Yes No Yes 
Yes 
(partly) 
Cultural Distance 
Theory 
Yes No Yes Yes 
 
As can be verified from the previous table, Disney has followed a fairly normal 
internationalisation process with the exception of Paris, a venture that the company 
eventually turned around by addressing the importance of local conditions. After Paris’ initial 
failure, the company learnt that when it comes to internationalisation it pays to respect 
foreign markets and closely follow theoretical recommendations, while still being open to 
radical exceptions, such as the recent partnering with the Chinese government. A more 
complete discussion of the results is offered in the next two sections.  
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9.1 International Diversification and Firm Performance: Results 
Research by Lu and Beamish (2004) showed that the performance from an international 
diversification strategy may result in a horizontal S-curve, which at the beginning showed a 
decline in performance with increasing internationalization, followed by an increase in 
performance which then declined at very high levels of international diversification. Even 
though Disney is a large company with commercial concerns that go beyond its theme park 
division, the effects of billion-dollar investments this sector are noticeable and consistent 
with Lu and Beamish’s approach. With the announcement of Shanghai Disneyland the 
company is effectively at or near the top of its international diversification strategy.  
Figure 9-1. 
International 
diversification 
and 
Performance: 
Results  
(Stock price and 
polynomial 
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Dollars, 1982- 
2011) 
 
 
Source: Yahoo! 
Finance, consulted 
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As can be seen from the previous figure, Disney effectively started its diversification process 
with Tokyo Disneyland. After huge success it ventured into France, where after some initial 
troubles it managed to turn around the operations into profitability. Hong Kong Disneyland 
also kept fuelling Disney’s international growth with more advantages than disadvantages. It 
is clear from the figure that with the announcement of Shanghai Disneyland the company 
might be approaching a point of inflexion after which each additional project might actually 
be detrimental to the company’s bottom line. Nonetheless, the picture is still incomplete and a 
definitive diagnosis cannot be made before evaluating performance of the company as a 
whole after a few years beyond the opening of the Chinese project.  
To summarize, Disney’s international diversification and firm performance is consistent with 
the S-curve proposed by Lu and Beamish (2004) where it has been consistently benefiting 
from international projects while rapidly approaching a point of diminishing returns.   
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10 Discussion 
The major pattern observed in Disney’s internationalisation process is a tendency to include a 
local partner, especially after the case of Paris where its decision to go solo resulted in severe 
financial losses for the company after failing to adapt its value-generating resources and 
capabilities. It is clear from the individual observations that Disney is gradually becoming an 
expert in internationalisation and it would not come as a surprise if the company starts 
working in future international ventures with more and more minority JV partners. 
Eventually it might be possible for the company to enter markets alone and stop sharing the 
pie, especially in the Asia region where it has developed recognized expertise.  
Paris remains an exception to the observations as a case of “temporary” greed by the 
American company. The general trend is one consistent with major theories of 
internationalisation like the Uppsala Stage Model. An exception is the Shanghai case, where 
Disney should have been able to work with a minority Chinese partner instead of with the 
government itself, but the decision is understandable given the unusually strong influence of 
the government in that country.  
The likely causes underlying this current modesty exhibited by Disney is the learning and 
experience that the company has accrued over the years. It will not, as it did with Paris, focus 
on “eating all the pie”, but on growing it and sharing it with value-adding local partners. As 
long as Disney stays loyal to this strategy it should not suffer from such difficulties again. 
In general the results from this research project are consistent with previous work in the area 
of internationalisation. It became evident that there is not a single internationalisation theory 
that explains all aspects of such a complex process. In some cases Transaction Cost 
Economics would recommend one solution only to be discredited by another framework, 
such as the Institutional-View to market entry (the China case). The value of mixed 
frameworks such as Dunning’s eclectic paradigm is clear in light of the challenges faced by 
companies going abroad, especially for practitioners (See Appendix I). 
Herein lays the major contribution of this project: companies should take a broad view when 
deciding how to go abroad while keeping in mind the inherent challenges of doing business 
in different cultures. At the end of the day it is better to share higher profits with a value-
adding local partner than to keep loses in a solo venture.  
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11 Conclusions 
At the current moment the theme park division of the Walt Disney Company is experiencing 
unprecedented success. With the Shanghai project starting in just a few months it is expected 
that this positive trend will continue. But this was not always the case.  
The single most important statement that we can derive from the observations is that when 
Disney stays relatively close to theoretical recommendations it tends to perform better. It took 
Disney 20 years to evaluate the Tokyo venture only to settle for the most conservative and 
theoretically correct solution: a licensing agreement. Good times in Tokyo convinced the 
company that it was ready for major international projects without further help from local 
partners, which was a strategic mistake when attempting to conquer the European market by 
its own. After a difficult turn-around of Disneyland Paris the company was able to internalize 
the lesson and return to a traditional path to internationalisation.  
The more recent cases of Hong Kong and Shanghai are living proof of the return to an all-
encompassing international strategy where the company seeks value-adding help from local 
partners. Disney has finally learnt that even highly unique resources and capabilities require 
some degree of adaptation in foreign markets. Disney was forced to learn that its value-
generating resources and capabilities were actually location-bound. An ideal partner for 
Disney is the one that is able to effectively and efficiently transfer those resources and 
capabilities with the required amount of adaptation, that is, one with high absorptive capacity. 
The best cases for Disney remain Tokyo and Hong Kong. In the Tokyo case the company 
acknowledged its lack of experience abroad and settled for a full-fledged licensing agreement 
with a local company. In Hong Kong, with more international experience accrued, the 
company rightly decided that a Joint Venture with a local partner was the best way to 
proceed. 
Shanghai will represent a challenge for the company. After the international experiences 
accrued it should be assumed that Disney should be able at this stage to conduct international 
projects with the help of only minority partners, that is, there is no longer any need to share a 
higher percentage of future profits. Opting for a 57/43 partnership with the Chinese 
government represents a reversal in Disney’s international expansion process in several 
respects. On the one hand, the Chinese government cannot be considered a value-adding 
partner in the sense that it is only providing financing and its official blessing for the project, 
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that is, it does not have the required absorptive capacity. Chinese officials will not certainly 
help Disney to adapt its value-generating resources and capabilities in the way a regular 
Chinese partner would have done so. On the other hand, given the inherent difficult 
conditions to conduct business in China, it makes sense for Disney to cope with these 
conditions in order to achieve first-mover status and asset mass efficiencies in the new 
market, which turns out to be the biggest one in the world. These contradictory conclusions 
are fully explained by all theories, and only by looking at them simultaneously can one 
comprehend Disney’s reasoning behind the China venture.  
From the research project it is evident that no single internationalisation theory covers all 
aspects related to going abroad. Even broad frameworks such as Dunning’s eclectic paradigm 
fail to take into account all the details that could make a mode of entry decision right or 
wrong. The Disney case is an example of how companies should approach 
internationalisation with an open mind (Tokyo), while being humble (Hong Kong) and 
willing to take risks (Paris and Shanghai). Truth is, even Paris is a success story nowadays.  
Answering the research project’s original research question, how different international 
entry modes affect Disney’s foreign theme parks performance given its unique resources 
and capabilities under different foreign conditions? It can be now said that the mode of 
entry decision is the single most important aspect that affects performance in an international 
venture given the way it affects implemented strategy, division of responsibilities, cash flow 
distribution and adaptation of location-bound value-generating resources and capabilities.  
As Professor George Yip mentioned at one of his lectures during my time at the Rotterdam 
School of Management, when it comes to internationalisation the motto “as global as 
possible, as local as necessary” becomes essential. Involvement of local partners will remain 
a necessary evil for Disney given its unique set of location-bound resources and capabilities. 
At the end of the day even so-called “purely global” companies like Coca Cola have different 
formulas to cater for slightly different tastes in different countries. Disney, as has been 
proven in this research project, is no exception.    
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12 Appendices 
Appendix I: Dunning’s paradigm: Ownership, Location and Internalisation 
Realizing that there’s no single theory to explain internationalisation, recent efforts in the 
field have focused in trying to combine several theories into one. Dunning’s updated ‘eclectic 
paradigm (1995, 1998, 2000) states that the mode of entry is influenced by three different 
advantages: ownership specific, location specific and internalisation advantages of integrating 
transactions. It is therefore a multi-theoretical approach that encompasses several theories 
into one. Dunning’s eclectic paradigm explains FDI by the interaction of these independent 
factors that form the so called “OLI Tripod” (Dunning, 1995, 1998, 2000): Ownership advantages 
1. Those relating to the possession and exploitation of monopoly power, which are 
presumed to create an entry barrier.  
2. Those relating to the possession of scarce, unique and sustainable resources and 
capabilities. 
3. Those relating to the competencies of the managers of firms. Location advantages 
1. Demand related variables (size, character and potential growth). 
2. Supply related variables (availability, price and quality of natural resources) and the 
existence of related clusters. 
3. Economies of scale and scope. 
4. Fiscal and other economic incentives. 
5. Exchange, political and economic risk levels.  Internalisation advantages 
1. To reduce transaction and coordinating costs inherent of market transactions.  
2. To capture coordinating and transactional benefits of common governance of related 
activities and to benefit from scale economies.  
3. To reduce the risk of external agents behaving against the interests of the principals. 
4. To reduce moral hazard and adverse selection. 
5. To tap into learning and experience.  
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